1) Duncan Campbell is not and should not be considered an authoritative
sources. He is an investigative journalist with a passion of exposes or
nominal -- but generally exaggerated -- claims of conspiracy and
wrong-doing. Much of his reputation as an intelligence and security
expert in the '80s came from a single coup in 1981 in which he acquired
from a dissaffected US intelligence official a number of US intelligence
community documents including a handbook giving the general
organisational structure of allied agencies. The document was relatively
anodyne, but Campbell's explication of the chart in a 1981 _New Statesman
and Society_ article displays a comprehensive lack of understanding of the
mechanisms described in the handbook. Unlike the Guardian's Richard
Norton-Taylor, Campbell never really maintained credible production in the
field.
2) The list is nominally of something like 114 officers. The SIS has
around 800 officers deployed in the field at any given point in time (up
considerably from 1994 when the published estimate was 400). It should be
pointed out that most resident officers, i.e. on station under 'diplomatic
cover' use the cover in only the most minimal fashion. As former Deputy
Chief of Service John Bruce Lockhart noted in a 1987 article, station
cover is little more than a 'fig leaf'. An SIS resident working from a
diplomatic position is usually (not always) declared to the host nation's
government albeit confidentially. Officially, the station exists to
provide liaison between the UK intelligence community and the host
government vis a vis common adversaries and concerns. Technically, the
'third country' rule prevents a station from operating against the host
country, e.g. the Bonn station would not recruit German sources, although
it might handle their clandestine communications (letter drops,
accomodation addresses &c); Bonn would more likely be used to target East
European or Middle Eastern nationals (esp. diplomats) working in or
travelling through Germany. Station cover is mainly to protect officers
against targetting by hostile agencies and terrorists. Hence a list of
114 officers stationed abroad, especially if culled from Foreign Office
lists &c is trivial, except to political and narco-terrorists and
suchlike. Announcing the Beirut HoS isn't going to come as a surprise to
the Lebanese government.
3) My understanding is that Tomlinson was not merely a 'loose cannon' but
also considered psychologically unstable, as was Shayler (and,
restrospectively through the Security Commission enquiry, Bettaney).
Claims about a hit against Diana are either the product of a fantasist or
an attention getting device, a bit like Wright's claims of an attempted
intelligence community removal of Harold Wilson (which, I would remind
listmembers, Wright subsequently publicly withdrew). The article has a
number of items which capture what appears to be an almost delusional
quality to Tomlinson's self-explanation -- e.g., but threatening SIS with
public exposure, he hopes to force them to leave him alone, or else. Is
this really likely to make them back down, or come after one with ever
greater determination?
4) It is not, of course, impossible that a plan to knock over Milosevic
might have been formulated, as a contingency (much as the oft-cited plan
to assassinate Nasser was essentially a feasibility exercise). Simply the
fact that a feasibility study might have been formulated and circulated
for comments does not indicate operational intent. One must keep in mind
(a) special operational plans are formulated on the basis of requirements
issued by consumers, e.g. Cabinet, JIC, MoD or FCO, if only to justify the
man-hours budgeted for the project (even at a feasibility study level),
and (b) any operational plan must be submitted to the SIS Foreign Office
Adviser (standard practice since 1952) for clearance, and since the 1994
ISA any operations contravening UK law (e.g. export controls) or
communications and property require an authorisation or warrant
respectively, signed by the Secretary of State.
4) Intelligence documents are subject to extremely strict handling
arrangements. Mishandling documents can be grounds for dismissal or even
prosecution. One does not leave operational files in Internet cafes in
the UK, let alone on station abroad. The JETSTREAM claims are obviously
notional and should be viewed as such. The fact that Campbell reports an
evidently dodgy source as if it is verified fact should provide a litmus
test of the man's mentality -- he's interested in allegation, not evidence
(read enough of his stuff, and you'll see that that is all the man is
about). It is not impossible that SIS might be in receipt of a
requirement from, e.g. the Treasury, Bank of England or DTI, for
information about EU partners -- as one official remarked about Europe to
a Chatham-house style briefing a couple of years ago, 'they are our
allies, but one has to keep in mind that they are still *foreign*
countries' -- but it is very unlikely. Certainly, related documents are
not going to go wandering out of the station offices.
5) Tomlinson is evidently feeling persecuted, but again Campbell reports
on the man's sentiments as if they were an accurate description of events.
The consistent refusal of residence in different countries is viewed as
being persecution -- but for heaven's sake, the UK and New Zealand are
part of the UKUSA special relationship (yes, New Zealand still, just look
at the Hager book _Secret Power_) with interlocking security legislation
and procedures. There's no way New Zealand will put what's left of its
access to UKUSA materials at risk just to provide sanctuary to a dubious
speciment like Tomlinson. And the US is dead centre of the intelligence
alliance. As for the French, the French system is actually much closer the
NATO/UKUSA alliance than it is popular to admit, and they aren't about to
put their access to WEU/NATO intelligence sharing at risk; moreover, there
is a question of interlocking treaty commitments through the WEU which
will prevent the French from turning a blind eye.
6)Campbell's claim that if the UK government had not drawn attention to
the posting it would never have been ready is either ill-informed or
disingenuous. There is, and has always been, a strong interest in
intelligence and 'parapolitics' on the internet, and there are a host of
sites and users who would be interested in the information.
On the whole, the credibility of the internet list is dubious, whoever put
it up, and the Diana claims are absurd. Tomlinson himself is also a
creature of questionable credibility. And Duncan Campbell is particularly
weak in terms of credibility also.
Phil
On Sun, 16 May 1999, Wendy & Dave Laing wrote:
> this article was printed in today's Melbourne Sunday Age newspaper (Sunday,
> 16th May 1999) Here's the full article for Sandbagger fans perusal!. Any
> comments?
>
>
> Wendy Laing
> Writer
> Visit my virtual home at
> http://www.ozemail.com.au/~wendave
> (don't forget to sign the guest book before your leave!)
>
>
>